Morizon presents itself as a bold new vision for global finance — a “profit-sharing ecosystem” uniting payments, real estate, crypto, and community development. The website is slick, the words sound inspirational, and the numbers look impressive.
But behind all that marketing talk, the evidence paints a very different picture.
This investigation exposes a tangled network of websites, conflicting jurisdictions, and empty promises that mirror classic MLM-style Ponzi operations we’ve seen many times before.
The Morizon Network of Domains
The Morizon empire currently operates across at least four active websites, each designed to reinforce the illusion of a fully fledged global fintech ecosystem:
- morizonhub.com – promotes itself as a global ecosystem spanning finance, real estate, and community projects.
- morizonpay.com – markets “merchant services” offering 27% monthly cash-back on profits.
- mymorizoncard.com – claims to provide UK IBAN accounts and Mastercard debit cards to customers.
- morizonsupport.com – functions as the supposed customer service hub, yet offers no verified company registration, corporate contact, or transparent escalation process.
Taken together, these interconnected sites create an image of scale and legitimacy — but the fragmented domain structure also raises serious questions about why a single company needs multiple overlapping brands to deliver one financial product line. In the world of unregulated fintech, such patterns often signal risk compartmentalisation, data segregation, or an attempt to evade cross-jurisdictional accountability.
All of them list the same address:
140a Queensway, Bletchley, Milton Keynes MK2 2AA, England, and the same parent company:
Morizon Ltd (Company No. 13822157).
They also reference an offshore entity, Morizon Group F.Z.C, supposedly registered in the UAE Free Zone of Ras Al Khaimah (RAKEZ) with license number 170283/6. No public record of that license currently exists.
This multi-domain setup is a classic sign of a rebranding-ready fraud network — allowing operators to pivot quickly when one domain is exposed or taken down.
Promises That Defy Reality
Morizon’s websites make extraordinary claims:
- 27% “Profit Sharing” across every service
- 27% “Cash Back” to merchants using Morizon Pay
- 200+ active agents and $20 million in transactions
- “Operations in over 100 countries”
- “UK regulated” and “FCA-connected”
Yet, none of these statements are backed by verifiable data, regulation numbers, or audited reports.
They appear designed purely to build credibility and attract early adopters before the inevitable collapse.
The “27% Profit Share” – A Familiar Ponzi Trick
One of the most suspicious features is the guaranteed 27% return — whether presented as profit sharing or cash-back on fees.
The wording shifts slightly between pages:
- On morizonhub.com, 27% of company profits are “shared with the community.”
- On morizonpay.com, merchants get 27% “cash-back from profits we earn on your merchant account.”
In both cases, no transparent accounting system is shown.
There are no audited statements, no published revenue sources, and no identifiable trustees managing these supposed community funds.
This “27%” number is too specific and too generous to be a coincidence. It’s the same psychological bait used by countless Ponzi operators to convince investors they’re participating in a legitimate, community-driven venture.
The UK Front and UAE Backdoor
Morizon’s structure attempts to straddle two legal systems:
- The UK arm (Morizon Ltd) claims to be “UK regulated,” while offering IBAN accounts and debit cards through alleged partnerships with Optimus Cards UK Ltd.
- The UAE arm (Morizon Group F.Z.C) claims oversight from RAKEZ and the UAE Central Bank.
Neither regulator lists Morizon or any related entity as authorized.
This “dual-jurisdiction” model is a well-known evasion tactic — giving the illusion of compliance while placing the operation outside the reach of both countries’ financial watchdogs.
Fake Partnerships and Borrowed Legitimacy
The websites repeatedly name-drop Optimus Cards UK Ltd (a real FCA-regulated company) and Pearl Property Stagers (a legitimate interior design business).
However, there’s no public evidence or press release confirming either company has any relationship with Morizon.
Scammers often exploit small legitimate firms’ names to build credibility.
If Optimus and Pearl Property Stagers are unaware of this usage, it’s clear Morizon is misrepresenting partnerships to build investor confidence.
The “Community Development” Narrative
Like many fraudulent ecosystems, Morizon uses a social-impact disguise to soften its sales pitch.
They claim that profits fund hospitals, schools, and local infrastructure through a “Community Development Fund.” Yet there’s no charity registration, no photos, no evidence of any real-world projects, and no breakdown of where money actually goes.
This “doing good while earning” storyline has become a common hallmark of moral-camouflage Ponzi schemes, designed to appeal to people who want to believe their money is helping others.
27% Cash-Back to Merchants? Unrealistic and Unregulated
On morizonpay.com, the company targets UK business owners — including high-risk industries like crypto, gambling, adult sites, and CBD — promising to “match or reduce existing merchant fees” and still give 27% back monthly.
In legitimate payment processing, merchant fees average 1–3% per transaction. Giving away 27% of net profit monthly would annihilate margins unless new money continuously enters the system.
This isn’t a sustainable business model — it’s cash-flow recycling, where one client’s deposit funds another’s “cash-back.” That’s the definition of a Ponzi mechanism.
Contradictory Claims and Multiple Legal Identities
Across the websites, Morizon claims to be:
- A UK financial technology company
- A UAE-licensed fintech ecosystem
- A Hong Kong, Seychelles, and USA-based corporation
Each site repeats similar disclaimers, but the supposed “license numbers” don’t trace to any official registry.
There’s no evidence of filings under any of the claimed jurisdictions.
This multi-jurisdictional confusion isn’t the mark of a global enterprise — it’s a red flag for jurisdictional evasion and regulatory camouflage.
The Compliance Theatre: “UK Regulated” in Name Only
Morizon’s newest site rollout is a masterclass in regulatory theatre — packed with professional-looking PDFs, buzzwords, and official-sounding policy documents that mimic legitimate fintech compliance, but without any verifiable oversight, licence, or regulator-issued credentials.
The homepage repeatedly claims that Morizon is a “UK regulated financial services provider” offering “full IBAN accounts, Mastercard debit cards, SWIFT and SEPA transfers, and bank-grade security.” Yet there is no trace of Morizon Ltd, Morizon Group F.Z.C, or any affiliated entity on the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) register, nor is there a disclosed BIN sponsor, EMI licence, or regulated banking partner.
Every aspect of their marketing reads like a bank-in-disguise: they promise “instant UK IBANs, direct debits, standing orders, faster payments, and multi-currency accounts”, followed by “physical and virtual Mastercards launching 60 days after IBAN rollout.” They even list “Optimus Payment Solutions” as their “core banking partner,” but fail to provide a regulatory reference number, country of incorporation, or any evidence that Optimus has authorised Morizon to issue accounts or cards on its behalf.
Dozens of glossy “official” compliance PDFs attempt to build credibility — Anti-Bribery & Corruption, Consumer Duty, Complaints Policy, Safeguarding & AML Audit Framework, Vulnerable Customers Policy — all using genuine FCA terminology like SMF16, SYSC, and DISP, but none provide audit trails, author signatures, or certificate IDs that would prove regulatory supervision. The documents even assign roles such as “Head of Compliance,” “MLRO (TFSF Ventures, Dubai),” and “Consumer Duty Champion,” yet no such individuals are identifiable through Companies House, the FCA Directory, or LinkedIn.
Morizon also advertises “PCI DSS Level 1” and “ISO 27001 Certified” status without naming an assessor or publishing a certificate number — an omission that would be unthinkable for any truly certified payment processor. Their supposed “ShuftiPro integration” is invoked as proof of identity verification, yet ShuftiPro acts purely as a third-party KYC vendor, not a regulatory body.
Even more troubling is their profit-sharing pitch, which combines unregulated e-money activity with an investment-style return. They claim to share “27% of all profits with the community,” turning ordinary account users into de-facto investors — a structure that would ordinarily require securities or collective investment registration. The company calls this “true profit sharing, not a rewards program,” but provides no financials, no audit, and no independent attestation to show that 27 percent of anything is actually distributed.
Morizon’s legal and compliance portal looks impressive at first glance, but closer inspection reveals a pattern: copied regulatory templates, self-authored policies, and unverifiable credentials — all designed to project legitimacy rather than prove it. The site’s staged launch schedule (“Phase 1 – IBANs in November 2025; Phase 2 – Mastercard within 60 days”) is reinforced by generic testimonials from “AJ – Alex Johnson,” “PP – Priya Patel,” and “JM – James Mitchell,” all conveniently untraceable.
In short, Morizon presents the appearance of a fully regulated UK fintech, while operating outside any publicly confirmed regulatory perimeter. Until the company produces:
- verifiable FCA authorisation,
- evidence of its BIN sponsor or e-money licence,
- authentic PCI DSS and ISO 27001 certificates,
- and audited proof of its 27 percent “profit-sharing” model,
its operation remains unsubstantiated at best — and highly misleading at worst.
Compliance Summary:
Morizon’s polished compliance façade — spread across morizonpay.com, morizonhub.com, mymorizoncard.com, and morizonsupport.com — looks convincing on the surface, but every layer collapses under scrutiny. The company borrows the language of regulation without the substance, using recycled documentation, unverifiable credentials, and a token profit-sharing model to project trust. In reality, there’s no proof of licensing, no independent audits, and no clear line between customer funds and corporate revenue. Like many scams disguised as fintech innovation, Morizon appears more interested in building confidence than building compliance.
The Missing Team and the Invisible Leadership
Although the company markets itself as having a “team of experts in banking, finance, and technology,” public filings list only one director — Amanda Joseph — with no visible executive team, compliance officer, or technical leadership disclosed anywhere online. This absence of supporting personnel raises questions about whether Morizon Ltd is a functioning fintech operation or simply a single-director shell company fronting a wider unregulated network.
Anonymous leadership in a company handling financial transactions is a major indicator of fraud risk and future exit potential. Once funds are collected, these operations typically vanish overnight, reappearing under a new name with the same web template.

Media Appearances and the “Ebony Villas” Diversion
In July 2024, The UK Black Business Guide published a feature on Ebony Villas and Elixir Heights, projects promoted under the Morizon brand. The article described the company as a “Black Owned Financial Technology Corporation” founded by Amanda Joseph (C.E.O.) and John Bennett C.O.O., allegedly based in the UK and of Caribbean descent.
It claimed that Morizon would build “Rent Free For Life Luxury African Homes” through its “Community Profit Sharing Programs.” The language mirrored the same 27 percent profit-share and community-empowerment messaging already found on the Morizon websites.
However, several red flags stand out:
- Companies House records show that Amanda Joseph (born February 1971, British) is the sole registered director and person with significant control of Morizon Ltd (Company No 13822157), incorporated 30 December 2021. No other officers or shareholders are listed, and John Bennett — named in marketing materials as the C.O.O. — does not appear in any official filings.
- The ebonyvillas.com and elixirheights.com domains appear connected to the same network of Morizon-branded sites, but contain no verifiable development plans, building permits, or independent project partners.
- The feature reads more like paid marketing content than editorial journalism, offering no third-party verification of construction timelines or funding sources.
This PR strategy appears designed to target trust within minority and faith-based communities, a tactic often used by international MLM and Ponzi operations to recruit through shared identity and social responsibility narratives.
Until tangible proof of real-world development, registered property assets, or verifiable leadership credentials emerge, Ebony Villas and Elixir Heights should be viewed as extensions of the same unregulated Morizon ecosystem rather than legitimate real-estate projects.
Right of Reply and the Response From Morizon

While no written reply was received, two short messages arrived via the company’s WhatsApp Contact Number:
“Thank you for your message. Just the evidence we need to sue you.”
“We were trying desperately to answer your questions on our Zoom and your channel and we were told to shut up and had to endure your filthy language and being called scammers. But now you want us to respond to this silly message. I strongly suggest that you do not post this misinformation as it will damage yourself not us. See you in court.”
No documents, company filings, or regulatory evidence were provided in response to any of the ten questions. Instead, the threats of legal action and the dismissive tone mirror the same intimidation tactics often used by unregulated financial promoters when confronted with legitimate scrutiny.
Anonymous Tip Following the Morizon Live Session
Shortly after the live discussion where Morizon representatives joined a public Zoom session, I received an anonymous email from an observer who claimed to have followed the event.
The message contained opinions about the group’s motives and tone during the meeting. While I won’t repeat those remarks in full, the correspondence suggested there were underlying social and ideological dynamics driving the recruitment style and community framing used by Morizon.
It’s important to note that, regardless of tone or ideology, financial regulation applies equally to everyone, and the company still has not provided evidence of licensing, oversight, or legitimate operations in either the UK or UAE.
Final Red Flags Summarised
- 27% profit-sharing and cash-back claims with no proof of revenue
- Unverified partnerships with FCA-regulated companies
- UAE license number untraceable in official databases
- Anonymous management and no directors listed on public materials
- Multiple conflicting jurisdictions (UK, UAE, Seychelles, USA, Hong Kong)
- Marketing language identical to known MLM / Ponzi templates
- Aggressive agent recruitment via “Weekly Sign-Up Classes”
- Promises of community impact without evidence
- Same Milton Keynes address reused across all sites
- Appeals to both low- and high-risk businesses, including crypto and gambling
Conclusion: A Global Rebrand Waiting to Happen
Morizon markets itself as a movement that “redefines what finance can build.”
But beneath the shiny graphics and emotionally charged slogans, the structure looks alarmingly familiar.
This is not a financial revolution — it’s a multi-domain, multi-jurisdiction Ponzi setup dressed up as fintech.
The language is polished, the branding professional, but the logic doesn’t add up.
Before trusting a company that promises 27% returns and worldwide profit sharing, investors and small business owners should ask:
Who is actually regulating them? Where is the money kept? Who audits their profits?
Until those questions are answered with verifiable documentation, Morizon should be treated as an unlicensed, high-risk operation potentially designed to siphon funds under the guise of community empowerment.
Disclaimer: How This Investigation Was Conducted
This investigation relies entirely on OSINT — Open Source Intelligence — meaning every claim made here is based on publicly available records, archived web pages, corporate filings, domain data, social media activity, and open blockchain transactions. No private data, hacking, or unlawful access methods were used. OSINT is a powerful and ethical tool for exposing scams without violating privacy laws or overstepping legal boundaries.
About the Author
I’m DANNY DE HEK, a New Zealand–based YouTuber, investigative journalist, and OSINT researcher. I name and shame individuals promoting or marketing fraudulent schemes through my channel, DANNY DE HEK INVESTIGATIONS. Every video I produce exposes the people behind scams, Ponzi schemes, and MLM frauds — holding them accountable in public.
My PODCAST is an extension of that work. It’s distributed across 18 major platforms — including Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, and iHeartRadio — so when scammers try to hide, my content follows them everywhere.
If you prefer listening to my investigations instead of watching, you’ll find them on every major podcast service. You can BOOK ME for private consultations or SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS, where I share first-hand experience from years of exposing large-scale fraud and helping victims recover.
“Stop losing your future to financial parasites. Subscribe. Expose. Protect.”
My work exposing crypto fraud has been featured in:
- Bloomberg Documentary (2025): A 20-minute exposé on Ponzi schemes and crypto card fraud
- News.com.au (2025): Profiled as one of the leading scam-busters in Australasia
- OpIndia (2025): Cited for uncovering Pakistani software houses linked to drug trafficking, visa scams, and global financial fraud
- The Press / Stuff.co.nz (2023): Successfully defeated $3.85M gag lawsuit; court ruled it was a vexatious attempt to silence whistleblowing
- The Guardian Australia (2023): National warning on crypto MLMs affecting Aussie families
- ABC News Australia (2023): Investigation into Blockchain Global and its collapse
- The New York Times (2022): A full two-page feature on dismantling HyperVerse and its global network
- Radio New Zealand (2022): “The Kiwi YouTuber Taking Down Crypto Scammers From His Christchurch Home”
- Otago Daily Times (2022): A profile on my investigative work and the impact of crypto fraud in New Zealand
I’m really happy that this site is no longer protected by Project Google Shield. After all, it doesn’t meet their criteria – it violates Section 8 and 10 of Project Shield’s User Content and Conduct Policy. I strongly encourage anyone reading to file a complaint to Google Shield – let’s ensure that they are not tricked into giving this site protection. It’s a for-profit business based on sensationalism and speculation, and nothing more.
Ah, John Citizen — still hiding behind the same tired ProtonMail alias and pretending to be the Internet’s moral compass.
It’s almost poetic how much time you invest in me. You’ve had your fake accounts removed, your one-star reviews deleted, and your smear attempts traced back to the same disposable inbox. Yet here you are again, lecturing from behind a curtain of anonymity.
Let me make this simple for anyone reading:
My site is protected by Google Project Shield — a cybersecurity initiative that protects journalists, not fraudsters. Google knows exactly who I am. I’ve spoken to their team directly, and they’re fully aware of the harassment campaigns coming from throwaway ProtonMail addresses like yours.
If you were genuinely concerned about “violations,” you’d use your real name, not another burner identity. But of course, transparency isn’t part of your skill set — deception is.
Keep filing your “reports,” John. Every time you do, you remind Google, Trustpilot, and the public why I exist — to expose cowards and con artists hiding behind fake profiles.
You’re not my problem; you’re my proof.
— Danny de Hek
NYT Featured Investigative Journalist | OSINT | Cult Survivor | Exposing Scams, Ponzi Schemes & MLMs | Name & Shame the Bad Actors Behind the Lies
Lol you might want to look into it again, Sherlock. There is no DDOS protection on your site – you’re not protected. Which is good, because you’re not a journalist.
Ps. You’re so easy to troll, I love it xx
Ah, John Citizen — still pretending to be clever while using the same IP address, same fake email, and the same recycled insults.
You’ve spent months trying to “troll” me, yet somehow I’m still here, and you’re still hiding behind a burner account posting love letters that start with “lol.”
You say I’m not a journalist — funny, because The New York Times, Bloomberg, and The Guardian all seem to disagree.
Meanwhile, your only publication is a comment section on my website.
If your definition of “winning” is repeatedly creating fake accounts to get my attention, then congratulations — you’ve successfully earned a one-way ticket to irrelevance.
P.S. Every time you comment, Google logs your IP, Cloudflare flags your device, and Project Shield gets another update on your activity.
So please, keep trolling.
You’re doing more for my analytics than my SEO team ever could.
— Danny de Hek
NYT Featured Investigative Journalist | OSINT | Cult Survivor | Exposing Scams, Ponzi Schemes & MLMs | Name & Shame the Bad Actors Behind the Lies