“When a fraud collapses, the real story isn’t just who gets arrested — it’s who doesn’t get sued.”
— Danny De Hek

When the United States government formally alleges that a company raised $328 million in a Ponzi scheme, the public instinct is to focus on the arrest.

In February 2026, Christopher Alexander Delgado was charged with wire fraud and money laundering in a federal criminal complaint filed in the Middle District of Florida. The affidavit outlines promises of 3% to 8% monthly returns, guarantees that principal would be returned “without diminution,” and representations that funds were being deployed into cryptocurrency liquidity pools.

That prosecution will now proceed in federal court.

But arrests are only one part of large financial collapses. What often matters just as much — and sometimes more — is what unfolds in civil court. Who gets named. Who does not. How liability is framed. Whether accountability expands beyond the central figure or remains confined to a corporate shell.

In the case of Goliath Ventures Inc., that second phase began before the arrest and continued immediately after it.

The Arrest Everyone Focused On — And the Lawsuits That Quietly Shaped the Narrative

On February 24, 2026, the Department of Justice publicly confirmed Delgado’s arrest. For many investors, the announcement felt like validation after months of uncertainty and unanswered withdrawal requests. The federal complaint referenced liquidity pool representations, dashboard balances, and contractual promises of principal protection — language that mirrored what investors had been shown inside the company.

But while headlines focused on the criminal case, a parallel track had already been moving forward in Broward County civil court.

PDFBefore Delgado was taken into custody, Three Civil Lawsuits had been filed seeking approximately $55 million collectively in alleged unpaid funds. Within days of the arrest, a Fourth Complaint followed. All four cases were handled by the same law firm: Shaw Lewenz. All four were directed at Goliath Ventures Inc. as a corporate entity.

None of them named the broader executive structure that helped run the company during its expansion.

That omission is not incidental. It is central to understanding how civil responsibility is being framed in the aftermath of a federal criminal complaint — and who, at this stage, has been left outside the defendant column.

The Role Nick Petrillo Played — And Why It Matters

Nick Petrillo was not a passive outside investor who simply placed capital and hoped for returns. He served as Chief Operating Officer of Goliath Ventures Inc. That title is not speculative; it appears in the company’s own structure and documentation. In one of the civil filings, he is referenced in communications confirming withdrawal requests during late 2025 — precisely when investors were attempting to exit and access funds.

When a company is facing what later becomes an alleged liquidity collapse, confirmations from a Chief Operating Officer are not administrative formalities. They reflect operational authority inside the organisation. A COO is positioned between executive leadership and functional execution. That role carries oversight, coordination, and awareness of internal mechanics.

This is not a minor technicality.

Beyond the formal filings, I have received repeated accounts from individuals alleging that Petrillo recruited or influenced a substantial number of participants into the Goliath structure. The figure of approximately 900 individuals has been mentioned to me multiple times. Whether that number proves to be exact or approximate, the broader allegation is clear: his involvement appears to have extended beyond passive investment and into active expansion.

That is where the civil strategy becomes difficult to ignore.

When the Broward County lawsuits were filed — three before the arrest and a fourth after — the legal focus remained fixed on Goliath Ventures Inc. as a corporate defendant. The complaints relied on contractual language. They cited withdrawal obligations. They sought recovery based on breach.

But they did not name the Chief Operating Officer.

They did not name recruiters.

They did not name affiliated entities that may have handled investor flows.

They did not widen the defendant column to reflect the executive structure that had been publicly associated with the company during its growth.

Instead, they targeted the shell.

Suing the contracting entity in a breach-of-contract action is not unusual. That alone proves nothing. But when documented insiders with operational authority remain outside the caption in a collapse of this magnitude, the decision becomes a matter of strategic choice — not inevitability.

And strategy, in civil litigation, determines who ultimately bears exposure.

A Tale of Two Legal Approaches

The contrast sharpens when examining the federal civil action filed on February 18, 2026 — six days before Christopher Delgado’s arrest.

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That Lawsuit, filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida by Prestige Florida Property Investment LLC, named Goliath Ventures, Inc. (Florida and Wyoming entities), Christopher Delgado, Jonathan Mason, Eric Clayman, and BlackBlock Management Solutions, LLC as defendants .

This was not a narrow breach-of-contract complaint.

It alleged a “massive cryptocurrency Ponzi scheme,” asserting violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, Florida securities law, the sale of unregistered securities, civil conspiracy, fraudulent inducement, and deceptive trade practices . It treated the “Joint Venture Agreement” as an unregistered security. It alleged that the guaranteed 4% monthly returns were knowingly false. It alleged that representations about insurance, reserves, and liquidity were materially misleading. It alleged coordinated “lulling” communications as the structure began to collapse.

Within the same week, two legal strategies were unfolding in parallel.

The Broward County filings handled by Shaw Lewenz LLLP confined liability to Goliath Ventures, Inc. as the corporate defendant, focusing on contractual obligations and unpaid balances.

The February 18 federal action did the opposite. It widened the scope. It named individuals. It named corporate officers. It named external counsel. It named the entity responsible for the so-called independent evaluation report .

That divergence is not cosmetic.

One theory confines exposure to a corporate shell. The other asserts that responsibility may extend to those who structured, promoted, vouched for, or operationally supported the structure itself.

When the alleged collapse involves approximately $328 million, scope determines whether accountability narrows — or expands.

The Billion-Dollar Statement — And the Burden of Proof

PDFIn coverage reported by Law360, counsel was quoted as saying they

“have reason to believe that there are hundreds of millions if not close to $1 billion locked up among other participants”

That is not a casual statement.

It is a claim of extraordinary scale — suggesting that funds far exceeding the $328 million referenced in the federal criminal complaint may exist elsewhere in the ecosystem.

When a lawyer says they “have reason to believe” something of that magnitude, a natural follow-up question arises:

What is that reason?

Is it based on forensic accounting?
Documented bank records?
Sworn financial disclosures?
Court-filed asset tracing?
Blockchain analysis?

Because “reason to believe” is not the same thing as evidence filed in court.

In the aftermath of an alleged $328 million Ponzi collapse, statements suggesting a recovery pool approaching $1 billion carry enormous psychological force. For investors who have suffered losses, that number does not simply inform — it inspires hope. Hope that funds are frozen but intact. Hope that assets are recoverable. Hope that the damage may not be permanent.

Hope influences decisions.

It influences which legal strategy investors align with. It influences which law firm they choose to trust. It influences whether they believe recovery is likely or remote.

But extraordinary figures require extraordinary transparency.

The Department of Justice’s criminal complaint references approximately $328 million raised. The Broward County civil lawsuits seek tens of millions in alleged unpaid balances. As of this writing, there is no publicly filed forensic accounting within those cases substantiating the existence of a billion-dollar reserve or locked asset pool.

When numbers of that magnitude are introduced without corresponding evidentiary filings, they shape expectation long before they are tested.

In complex financial collapses, expectation can become strategic.

Investors deserve clarity grounded in documents — not projections grounded in belief.

Because in civil litigation, optimism does not secure judgments.

Evidence does.

The Broader Professional Circle

The civil filings surrounding Goliath Ventures do not exist in a vacuum. In separate litigation involving WOW Lottery Ventures, the same law firm — Shaw Lewenz — appears in court records connected to preservation demands, subpoena disputes, and objections related to document production.

Within those materials, the name Harry M. Samuels surfaces in connection with LLC structuring and financial record issues. Objections were filed seeking to limit disclosure in those matters. On their own, those filings do not establish wrongdoing. Lawyers routinely defend clients aggressively. Accountants routinely structure entities.

But proximity matters.

When the same law firm and the same accountant appear across interconnected financial structures, and when litigation later emerges that narrowly frames liability around a single corporate entity, those overlaps become relevant context. They do not prove coordination. They do not establish misconduct. But they illustrate how tightly connected the professional ecosystem can be.

In complex financial collapses, professional networks often extend beyond a single company. Corporate entities, affiliated LLCs, advisory relationships, and legal representation can overlap across ventures. When those networks reappear in separate disputes, it becomes reasonable to examine whether litigation strategy is influenced by a broader web of relationships.

Patterns are not proof.

But in financial investigations, patterns are often where the deeper story begins.

Keeping Liability Narrow

Two of the civil lawsuits filed before Delgado’s arrest were brought by entities that had direct business relationships within the Goliath ecosystem. These were not detached retail investors who discovered the opportunity through advertising. They were participants connected to the operational structure of the company during its active phase.

That context matters.

When individuals or entities operating within the same ecosystem initiate litigation that focuses exclusively on the corporate shell, it shapes how responsibility is publicly framed. It narrows the lens. It confines the battlefield. It defines the scope of exposure before broader questions are even tested.

Viewed structurally, the sequence is striking. Lawsuits are filed by associated entities. The corporate defendant is named. The CEO is later arrested. And yet the broader executive structure — including operational leadership — remains outside the defendant column.

That structure carries consequences.

It influences public perception. It determines who is seen as central to the collapse and who remains peripheral. It concentrates legal exposure on a single corporate entity and a single individual while leaving other actors — who may have held authority, influence, or recruitment roles — unexamined in civil court.

To be clear, this is not an accusation of misconduct by counsel. Lawyers choose strategies based on many factors: evidence thresholds, asset recovery calculations, jurisdictional considerations, and procedural timing.

But strategy has effects.

And the effect here is clear: civil exposure has, so far, remained tightly contained.

In a collapse of this magnitude, that containment deserves scrutiny.

Fraud Has More Than One Battlefield

When a financial collapse reaches the scale alleged in the federal complaint, it unfolds across more than one arena. The criminal case is one battlefield, where prosecutors pursue alleged violations of federal law and determine whether conduct meets the threshold of fraud, money laundering, or conspiracy. That process is structured, evidentiary, and governed by strict constitutional protections.

But the civil arena is another battlefield entirely. It is where responsibility is allocated — or limited. It is where recovery strategies are chosen. It is where the scope of exposure is either expanded to include operational actors or confined to the corporate entity that signed the agreements.

When those two arenas unfold simultaneously, strategy matters.

If civil litigation in a collapse of this magnitude remains tightly focused on a single corporate defendant while a broader executive structure existed during the company’s expansion, it is reasonable for investors to ask whether accountability is being fully pursued or strategically contained.

Fraud does not end with an arrest.

It enters a second phase in which liability is defined, negotiated, and sometimes narrowed long before trial testimony is ever heard.

Investors deserved warnings during the growth phase.

They deserve clarity during the collapse phase.

Until the broader executive structure is either formally cleared through documented evidence or formally included through expanded civil exposure, the questions remain open.

And asking those questions is not reckless.

It is responsible.

The Question Every Investor Now Needs to Ask

At this point, investors are no longer spectators. They are decision-makers.

If recovery is possible — and that remains uncertain — the question is not simply whether money can be reclaimed. The question is who will pursue it, and how far they are prepared to go.

Will the strategy remain focused primarily on Goliath Ventures Inc. as a corporate shell, treating the collapse as a contractual breach between investors and a company name? Or will the strategy expand to examine the broader operational network — the executives, recruiters, affiliated entities, and internal leadership structure that functioned while investor funds were flowing?

This is not a rhetorical contrast. It is a practical one.

If liability remains confined to the corporation alone, what becomes of those who publicly aligned themselves with the company’s growth? What of the partners who recruited participants, the individuals who managed downlines, the executives who held formal authority, or the affiliated LLC structures that may have handled investor funds?

Multiple individuals connected to this ecosystem travelled, appeared at events, celebrated milestones, and positioned themselves as part of the company’s leadership narrative. If any of those individuals exercised meaningful influence over recruitment, operations, or investor communication, then accountability logically extends beyond a single defendant listed on a civil caption.

Limiting exposure to one corporate entity in a collapse alleged to involve $328 million risks narrowing responsibility in a way that may not reflect the structure that was publicly presented to investors.

Investors should think carefully about that.

Because civil litigation strategy defines the battlefield. It determines whether the net is cast narrowly — or broadly. It determines whether responsibility remains concentrated — or distributed across those who helped build and operate the machine.

And the question is now unavoidable:

Is your legal representation pursuing everyone who participated in the structure — or only the name that made the headlines?

That choice may determine whether accountability expands — or quietly contracts.

Disclaimer: How This Investigation Was Conducted

This investigation relies entirely on OSINT — Open Source Intelligence — meaning every claim made here is based on publicly available records, archived web pages, corporate filings, domain data, social media activity, and open blockchain transactions. No private data, hacking, or unlawful access methods were used. OSINT is a powerful and ethical tool for exposing scams without violating privacy laws or overstepping legal boundaries.

About the Author

I’m DANNY DE HEK, a New Zealand–based YouTuber, investigative journalist, and OSINT researcher. I name and shame individuals promoting or marketing fraudulent schemes through my YOUTUBE CHANNEL. Every video I produce exposes the people behind scams, Ponzi schemes, and MLM frauds — holding them accountable in public.

My PODCAST is an extension of that work. It’s distributed across 18 major platforms — including Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, and iHeartRadio — so when scammers try to hide, my content follows them everywhere. If you prefer listening to my investigations instead of watching, you’ll find them on every major podcast service.

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